Hi, I'm Mick

[Mick]

My general rule of thumb when looking at philosophical concepts is to see what Sam Harris thinks. In your wiki link it seems that Harris doesn't accept the naturalistic fallacy and so, in that case, I must accept the validity of the naturalistic fallacy (since Harris is usually wrong).

Yeah, that's pretty much my view as well. I find Harris's arguments spectacularly naive.

I think most people do. You might enjoy this:

http://i.imgur.com/1PjSMwz.png

http://i.imgur.com/RqcAgVa.png

http://i.imgur.com/d2JZGKx.jpg

It is certainly naive to go directly from a biological "is" to an ethical "ought". However, the background of a biological picture of humans as a species whose characteristics are partly determined by millions of years of natural selection is too valuable to be dismissed. Any view of humans, and how they behave or should behave that views them purely as a tabla rasa is doomed to failure.

I'm not quite sure what you're saying here, as ethics doesn't really play into anything related to blank slatism. You can have a perfectly valid ethical system which completely rejects all known biological facts and that wouldn't be a case of blank slatism.

You're not understanding the theory here.

I understand fine, I think you might be referring to natural law, not the naturalist rejection of is-ought Seth is advocating.

Medicine is fine, since it corrects the natural function of whatever or preserves the natural function of a higher good. This is also the same for surgery.

How are you defining "higher good"?

Driving a car is fine. This is looked at as an extension of a natural function. Yet, the middle line is emphasized. If you drive so much that you neglect to exercise your legs, that they become weak and frail, then that's an issue.

Why isn't having sex for fun or having sex with other men an extension of natural function?

Why the fuck can't you own property?

Because ownership of property isn't natural and if someone argues that we should conform to natural standards, then you're in a bit of a pickle there.

Rape is a good thing? What?1?!

There is evidence that rape is a natural mating strategy and has been good in promoting the survival of our species.

I hold the same for lesbians.

Then good for you, many don't.

A sterile, heterosexual couple who do not use contraception do nothing to frustrate the end of sex. So, it is not an issue.

But they are using sex without procreating.

A higher good might be a natural faculty with greater conduciveness to the being of a person. Suppose I get surgery to put in a cochlear implant. This is for the greater good of my being, since it helps or correct my hearing, allows me to engage in the hearing world, hear speech sound, etc..

Homosexual sex isn't an extension of sex, since the telos of sex is frustrated. Extensions aren't supposed to frustrate the end.

Ownership is not unnatural in the relevant sense. Naturalness pertains to form and end. where do you see these aspects frustrated?

Rape occurs in nature, sure. But that doesn't make it natural in the relevant sense. Plenty of conditions occur in nature naturally. Club foot is a natural occurrence, but it is unnatural or disordered in the sense of form and end. There is a fallacious equivocation going on here.

Using sex without procreating? Well, they're having sex and it will most likely not lead to procreation. But so what? Nothing they are doing and intending is frustrating the end of sex. Mind you, if you had sex with a barren women with the intent of having sex without being open to procreation, that is, so you could have sex without pregnancy, then that is an issue. However, a couple who happens to be sterile do not frustrate a natural end, so long as they are open to procreating.

That's still a naturalistic fallacy. Why is a "natural end", whatever that is, relevant to anything at all?

Still the naturalistic fallacy?

First, I wasn't trying to make the case that there is no naturalistic fallacy. I was speaking about the equivocation on the meanings of natural.

Second, the naturalistic fallacy is something conjured by Moore, something against the idea of defining and reducing moral properties to natural ones. It is a charge against a sort of a priori naturalism--it is not the same as the is/ought distinction. I thought we were speaking about the latter.

Third, it is question begging to presume that it is a fallacy. You're begging the question against the whole project of naturalism. As atheist philosopher Michael Martin notes:

"Copan's argument against naturalistic metaethics is elusive. In his earlier paper his complaint seemed to be that naturalistic ethics cannot have an ontological foundation. In my reply to Copan I explained that naturalists say it has a naturalistic ontological foundation; that is, they say that moral properties are constituted by natural properties. In his letter Copan seems to have modified his criticism. Naturalists such as Firth, Boyd, Brink and Railton, Copan now says, are committing the naturalistic fallacy (NF) by inferring "ought" from "is." However, as William Frankena pointed out long ago, to say that someone commits the NF begs the question.[7] It assumes what it must prove, namely, that factual statements never entail ethical statements. But if moral terms mean the same as natural terms, one can infer "ought" from "is". Naturalists such as Firth have proposed definitions of "ought" in terms of "is". These cannot be easily refuted since the postulated meaning relation between "ought" and "is" may be covert or opaque.

In addition, even if it were a fallacy to infer "ought" from "is," this would not defeat naturalism. Naturalists need only claim that moral properties are constituted by natural properties -- no meaning relation between "ought" and "is" has to be assumed. In this case naturalism would infer normative statements from factual statements only when factual statements were combined with bridge statements specifying a contingent relation between moral and natural properties. Such bridge statements would be justified by how well they cohere with other statements and how well they explain our moral experience. It is dubious, therefore, that NF can be used to refute naturalistic ethics. One must look at particular arguments in detail to see if some specific mistake has been made. Unfortunately, Copan seems disinclined to do this. Indeed, it is unclear to me that Copan has even read some of the naturalistic ethicists I have cited. For example, Brink devotes an entire chapter in his book to the is-ought issue[8] yet Copan seems unaware of Brink's arguments and merely dismisses his point concerning the supervenience of the mental on the physical."

http://infidels.org/library/modern/mich ... llacy.html

[colubridae]

...
One of the huge downfalls of the mechanistic model is that we need to grab the norm for how our mental states ought to be from outside the nature of the mind or brain itself. if it has no inherent proper function, then there is no inherent particular way or function the mind or brain ought to behave. The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

What a bunch of babblewank!

... The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

There's no member with the name Norman, nor any of his relatives, on the forum.

[Mick]

So anyway, got any evidence of this god of yours?

I posted a link.

[Mick]

...
One of the huge downfalls of the mechanistic model is that we need to grab the norm for how our mental states ought to be from outside the nature of the mind or brain itself. if it has no inherent proper function, then there is no inherent particular way or function the mind or brain ought to behave. The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

What a bunch of babblewank!

... The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

There's no member with the name Norman, nor any of his relatives, on the forum.

What a bunch of babblewank!

-insert smug smile and a sense of victory-

[colubridae]

...
One of the huge downfalls of the mechanistic model is that we need to grab the norm for how our mental states ought to be from outside the nature of the mind or brain itself. if it has no inherent proper function, then there is no inherent particular way or function the mind or brain ought to behave. The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

What a bunch of babblewank!

... The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

There's no member with the name Norman, nor any of his relatives, on the forum.

What a bunch of babblewank!

-insert smug smile and a sense of victory-

You posted a pageful of painfully obvious babblewank. Why would I feel smug pointing out the obvious, or have a sense of victory

If you'd posted something 'meaningful' and I'd refuted it, then I would feel a sense of pride. But for your babblewank, it barely needs a reply, its so dumb.

[Mick]

...
One of the huge downfalls of the mechanistic model is that we need to grab the norm for how our mental states ought to be from outside the nature of the mind or brain itself. if it has no inherent proper function, then there is no inherent particular way or function the mind or brain ought to behave. The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

What a bunch of babblewank!

... The norm for it being improper is external; it comes from a projected value system---it cannot but fall into relativism.

There's no member with the name Norman, nor any of his relatives, on the forum.

What a bunch of babblewank!

-insert smug smile and a sense of victory-

You posted a pageful of painfully obvious babblewank. Why would I feel smug pointing out the obvious, or have a sense of victory

If you'd posted something 'meaningful' and I'd refuted it, then I would feel a sense of pride. But for your babblewank, it barely needs a reply, its so dumb.

I wonder if you think anyone buys this excuse.

[pErvinalia]

Yeah, that's pretty much my view as well. I find Harris's arguments spectacularly naive.

I think most people do. You might enjoy this:

http://i.imgur.com/1PjSMwz.png

http://i.imgur.com/RqcAgVa.png

http://i.imgur.com/d2JZGKx.jpg

It is certainly naive to go directly from a biological "is" to an ethical "ought". However, the background of a biological picture of humans as a species whose characteristics are partly determined by millions of years of natural selection is too valuable to be dismissed. Any view of humans, and how they behave or should behave that views them purely as a tabla rasa is doomed to failure.

I'm not quite sure what you're saying here, as ethics doesn't really play into anything related to blank slatism. You can have a perfectly valid ethical system which completely rejects all known biological facts and that wouldn't be a case of blank slatism.

You're not understanding the theory here.

I understand fine, I think you might be referring to natural law, not the naturalist rejection of is-ought Seth is advocating.

Medicine is fine, since it corrects the natural function of whatever or preserves the natural function of a higher good. This is also the same for surgery.

How are you defining "higher good"?

Driving a car is fine. This is looked at as an extension of a natural function. Yet, the middle line is emphasized. If you drive so much that you neglect to exercise your legs, that they become weak and frail, then that's an issue.

Why isn't having sex for fun or having sex with other men an extension of natural function?

Why the fuck can't you own property?

Because ownership of property isn't natural and if someone argues that we should conform to natural standards, then you're in a bit of a pickle there.

Rape is a good thing? What?1?!

There is evidence that rape is a natural mating strategy and has been good in promoting the survival of our species.

I hold the same for lesbians.

Then good for you, many don't.

A sterile, heterosexual couple who do not use contraception do nothing to frustrate the end of sex. So, it is not an issue.

But they are using sex without procreating.

A higher good might be a natural faculty with greater conduciveness to the being of a person. Suppose I get surgery to put in a cochlear implant. This is for the greater good of my being, since it helps or correct my hearing, allows me to engage in the hearing world, hear speech sound, etc..

Homosexual sex isn't an extension of sex, since the telos of sex is frustrated. Extensions aren't supposed to frustrate the end.

Ownership is not unnatural in the relevant sense. Naturalness pertains to form and end. where do you see these aspects frustrated?

Rape occurs in nature, sure. But that doesn't make it natural in the relevant sense. Plenty of conditions occur in nature naturally. Club foot is a natural occurrence, but it is unnatural or disordered in the sense of form and end. There is a fallacious equivocation going on here.

Using sex without procreating? Well, they're having sex and it will most likely not lead to procreation. But so what? Nothing they are doing and intending is frustrating the end of sex. Mind you, if you had sex with a barren women with the intent of having sex without being open to procreation, that is, so you could have sex without pregnancy, then that is an issue. However, a couple who happens to be sterile do not frustrate a natural end, so long as they are open to procreating.

That's still a naturalistic fallacy. Why is a "natural end", whatever that is, relevant to anything at all?

Still the naturalistic fallacy?

First, I wasn't trying to make the case that there is no naturalistic fallacy. I was speaking about the equivocation on the meanings of natural.

Second, the naturalistic fallacy is something conjured by Moore, something against the idea of defining and reducing moral properties to natural ones. It is a charge against a sort of a priori naturalism--it is not the same as the is/ought distinction. I thought we were speaking about the latter.

Third, it is question begging to presume that it is a fallacy. You're begging the question against the whole project of naturalism. As atheist philosopher Michael Martin notes:

"Copan's argument against naturalistic metaethics is elusive. In his earlier paper his complaint seemed to be that naturalistic ethics cannot have an ontological foundation. In my reply to Copan I explained that naturalists say it has a naturalistic ontological foundation; that is, they say that moral properties are constituted by natural properties. In his letter Copan seems to have modified his criticism. Naturalists such as Firth, Boyd, Brink and Railton, Copan now says, are committing the naturalistic fallacy (NF) by inferring "ought" from "is." However, as William Frankena pointed out long ago, to say that someone commits the NF begs the question.[7] It assumes what it must prove, namely, that factual statements never entail ethical statements. But if moral terms mean the same as natural terms, one can infer "ought" from "is". Naturalists such as Firth have proposed definitions of "ought" in terms of "is". These cannot be easily refuted since the postulated meaning relation between "ought" and "is" may be covert or opaque.

In addition, even if it were a fallacy to infer "ought" from "is," this would not defeat naturalism. Naturalists need only claim that moral properties are constituted by natural properties -- no meaning relation between "ought" and "is" has to be assumed. In this case naturalism would infer normative statements from factual statements only when factual statements were combined with bridge statements specifying a contingent relation between moral and natural properties. Such bridge statements would be justified by how well they cohere with other statements and how well they explain our moral experience. It is dubious, therefore, that NF can be used to refute naturalistic ethics. One must look at particular arguments in detail to see if some specific mistake has been made. Unfortunately, Copan seems disinclined to do this. Indeed, it is unclear to me that Copan has even read some of the naturalistic ethicists I have cited. For example, Brink devotes an entire chapter in his book to the is-ought issue[8] yet Copan seems unaware of Brink's arguments and merely dismisses his point concerning the supervenience of the mental on the physical."

http://infidels.org/library/modern/mich ... llacy.html

I've got no idea what you are going on about. You can't derive objective 'oughts' from 'is's'.

[Mick]

I've got no idea what you are going on about. You can't derive objective 'oughts' from 'is's'.

It might be that you don't have a clue what I'm talking about because you've only scratched the surface of this issue, deploying slogans rather than delving into the reasons why the is/ought distinction is championed by some. Do work. Read about this important debate.

[pErvinalia]

Why don't you try and explain it without the salad?

Quite simply, what does something being natural have anything to do with how one should behave?

[Babel]

Why don't you try and explain it without the salad?

Quite simply, what does something being natural have anything to do with how one should behave?

Or why it's unnatural even if it happens in nature. Or aren't we part of nature, making all our actions natural by definition?

[macdoc]

It might be that you don't have a clue what I'm talking about because you've only scratched the surface of this issue, deploying slogans rather than delving into the reasons why the is/ought distinction is championed by some. Do work. Read about this important debate.

It might be you haven't a clue...

Important to who?....theists that can't get off the skydaddy nipple?

[Mick]

Why don't you try and explain it without the salad?

Quite simply, what does something being natural have anything to do with how one should behave?

Or why it's unnatural even if it happens in nature. Or aren't we part of nature, making all our actions natural by definition?

I can quickly address this.

We can't equivocate on the meanings here. Clubfoot is a natural occurrence, some natural defect of a sort. It is natural in the sense that it isn't manmade or artificial, that it happens to be an organic defect or occurrence. However, in another sense, in the sense of Aristotle's philosophy, clubfoot is unnatural; it is disordered. By this we mean that it doesn't conform to the way a human ought to be, according to his form and the finality of his foot. This is what allows for us to call it a defect in the first place. We err when we conflate the two senses.

[Mick]

It might be that you don't have a clue what I'm talking about because you've only scratched the surface of this issue, deploying slogans rather than delving into the reasons why the is/ought distinction is championed by some. Do work. Read about this important debate.

It might be you haven't a clue...

Important to who?....theists that can't get off the skydaddy nipple?

Um, it is important to philosophers. You'll note that the philosopher I referred to is an atheist philosopher, one who defends an atheistic moral realism. It's important to him, and he is no theist. It was important to Hume. He was no theist.

[pErvinalia]

Why don't you try and explain it without the salad?

Quite simply, what does something being natural have anything to do with how one should behave?

Or why it's unnatural even if it happens in nature. Or aren't we part of nature, making all our actions natural by definition?

I can quickly address this.

We can't equivocate on the meanings here. Clubfoot is a natural occurrence, some natural defect of a sort. It is natural in the sense that it isn't manmade or artificial, that it happens to be an organic defect or occurrence. However, in another sense, in the sense of Aristotle's philosophy, clubfoot is unnatural; it is disordered. By this we mean that it doesn't conform to the way a human ought to be, according to his form and the finality of his foot. This is what allows for us to call it a defect in the first place. We err when we conflate the two senses.

And what relevance does this have to do with the debate (even if we grant the logic of it)?

[VazScep]

What's your opinion on cybernetic augmentation, Mick, and transhumanism?